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Article 5

ARBITRATION UNBOUND?: THE LEGACY OF

McMAHON1
Bruce M. Selya t
INTRODUCTION

In Shelley's rendition of the Prometheus legend, the Greek
god passes a torch of fire to Mankind in order to free humanity
from the failed rule of a pantheon of spiteful deities.' Acting in
what appears to have been a kindred spirit, the Supreme
Court, in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. Mcfahon,2 authorized the securities industry to substitute the free-form
litheness of arbitration for the weary rituals of adjudication,
thereby carving out an escape route from Law's Dominion.
While it was not love at first sight,3 the securities industry
came to embrace the concept. The industry's ardor for arbitral
solutions has not since waned-romances have a tendency to
last despite increased awareness of a loved one's flaws-but it
is fair to say that the perceived advantages of arbitration over
adjudication have diminished. Thus, as McMahon's tenth anniversary approaches, it is appropriate to ask if the securities
industry's marriage to legal privatization is headed for the
rocks.

©1996 Bruce M. Selya. All Rights Reserved.
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit; Adjunct
Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; Adjunct Professor of Law, Boston
University School of Law;, J.D., 1958, Harvard Law School; A.B., 1955, Harvard
College. The author is indebted to Michael C. Keats, J.D., 1995, Boston University;
Adam E. Pachter, J.D., 1996, University of Chicago; and Marisol Garcia, J.D.,
1997, Northeastern University School of Law, for their assistance in researching
aspects of this subject.
PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY, PROMETHEUS UNBOUND (1819).
482 U.S. 220, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987).
See, e.g., George H. Friedman, Changes in Rules on Securities Cases, N.Y.
L.J., Aug. 5, 1993, at 3, 28 (crediting McMahon with fanning the flames of affection for arbitration within the securities industry, though not producing instant
enthusiasm for it).
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Part I of this Article chronicles the Supreme Court's pilgrimage from atheism to evangelism with respect to securities
arbitration and posits that McMahon inaugurated a new era in
the handling of securities disputes. Part II considers the extent
to which the passing of the torch to securities arbitrators has
succeeded in liberating investors and brokerage houses from
the shackles of civil litigation. It begins by investigating the
conditions that spawned the push for arbitration and then
concludes that the new freedom, securities arbitration, is coming to resemble the old tyranny, conventional adjudication.
Part II also explores some of the possible systemic reasons for
this development. Part III posits that we should become increasingly worried about the future of securities arbitration, as
too many of the reforms that have been proposed for the industry threaten to push arbitration further toward the litigation
model. Part IV discusses the consequences of these trends,
suggesting that securities arbitration, in its current evolution,
faces a substantial threat to its continued independence: it
may become so similar to litigation as to cease to be a viable
alternative to the courts. If this happens, the courts' own alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") systems may expand to fill
the space that the arbitrators have abandoned.
Finally, Part V suggests the following: that privately sponsored securities arbitration is a desirable alternative to adjudication, and that society benefits from having multiple options
available. To avoid undermining this duality, however, securities arbitration must return to its mission as an efficient alternative dispute resolving mechanism rather than recasting
itself as a cheap copy of the courts.
I. THE PROMETHEAN GESTURE
An historic perspective on the case law lays bare the
framework of the debate. The acceptability vel non of securities
arbitration as an alternative to the courts has closely followed
the zeitgeist of the era in which the question arose. When the
Supreme Court first addressed the matter in Wilko v. Swan,4
public confidence in our principal social institutions, including
346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).

19961

THE LEGACY OF 1cMAHON

1435

the courts, was relatively high, and post-Depression suspicion
of the private sector continued to ferment. In hindsight, we see
the Wilko Court, flush with memories of the multifarious abuses perpetrated by the securities industry in the Roaring Twenties, struggling to reconcile the New Deal investor protections
contained in the Securities Act of 1933 with the policy choices
of the earlier laissez faire Congress that enacted the Federal
Arbitration Act of 1925 (the "FAA").
In Wilko, an investor signed a margin agreement in which
he consented to forgo the opportunity to sue in the event a
dispute arose, agreeing instead to submit any claims against
the broker to binding arbitration.' The Court faced an apparent conflict: In the Securities Act, Congress created a right of
action for investors to sue brokerage houses that engaged in
deceptive sales practices, and, in the bargain, it resolutely
declared that waivers of the Act's protections would be impuissant;6 earlier, however, Congress had enacted the FAA to permit parties to settle their disputes rapidly and cheaply in an
arbitral forum.
In attempting to reconcile the competing centrifugal and
centripetal forces that pushed and pulled these statutory
schemes, the Court expressed its deep mistrust of industrysponsored arbitration, notwithstanding the evident purpose of
the FAA. While acknowledging that Congress had placed its
imprimatur on private arbitration as an acceptable alternative
to the "complications of litigation,"7 the Court refused to pay
blind obeisance to that seal of approval. It concluded instead
that the policies of the FAA should be subrogated to those of
the Securities Act and that the protections of the latter would
be "lessened in arbitration as compared to judicial proceedings.
The Wilko Court proffered several reasons for its jaundiced
view of arbitral venues. First, the Justices remarked on the
securities industry's sordid past and noted that, unlike commercial arbitration-which typically pitted parties of relatively
equal bargaining power against each other before an industry

5 Id

at 435.
6 Id at 428-30.
Id. at 431.
8 Id. at 435.
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arbitrator-securities arbitration (not a new phenomenon when
the Wilko Court studied the question) usually involved a battle
between small investors and large corporate entities in a forum
controlled by the industry.' Relatedly, the Court observed that
securities arbitration differed from commercial arbitration in
that the former often required findings on the state of mind of
an alleged wrongdoer whereas the latter usually needed nothing more subtle than a determination of the amount of money
due under a contract or the quality of a commodity.' °
Second, the Court noted the widespread practice of arbitrators to announce results unaccompanied by written opinions." This praxis, the Court mused, made it likely that the
law would cease to grow in the securities area, creating a substantial probability that arbitrators would apply inconsistent
standards to different cases. Finally, the Court pointed out the
difficulty of performing meaningful appellate review of an
arbitral decision given the absence of either a written opinion
or a developed record. 2 The Wilko Court feared that, if securities arbitration became the norm, congressional intent would
be thwarted as no rule of law would limit the avarice of the
securities industry. Accordingly, the Court found the preservation of the choice of a judicial forum essential to vindicating
rights under the Securities Act. In other words, the industryspecific policies of the Securities Act trumped the FAA's more
broadly focused policies favoring private agreements to arbitrate disputes. Therefore, the Court held that predispute arbitration agreements comprised invalid waivers of the
protections conferred by the Securities Act.
Lower federal courts extended the Wilko principle over the
next three decades to encompass various other claims arising
under not only the Securities Act but also the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which contains a similar nonwaiver proviWilko, 346 U.S. at 435.
at 435-36.
Id. at 436. Justice Jackson noted in his concurrence that presumably agree-

10 Id.
"

ments to submit disputes to arbitrators after a dispute arose would be enforceable.
See id. at 438. Subsequent courts so held. See C. Edward Fletcher III, Privatizing
Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements, 71 MINN.
L. REV. 393, 420 n.193 (1987) (collecting cases). Today, the overwhelming majority
of disputes proceed to arbitration under the guise of a predispute arbitration
agreement.
12 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436.
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sion 3 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"). 4 Employing somewhat different reasoning, but relying to a certain degree on Wilko's wary attitude toward arbitration, federal courts also refused to allow arbitrators to decide Title VII, 5 ERISA,"6 and antitrust claims.1"
The Supreme Court revisited the issue of arbitration in
the securities context in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.'" There,
the Court permitted a claim under the Exchange Act to proceed to arbitration. The Scherk Court distinguished Wilko on
the ground that the dispute sub judice involved an international securities transaction raising conflict-of-law problems not
associated with domestic securities transactions.'9 The Scherk
Court classified the arbitration clause as a "specialized kind of
forum selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but
also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute.' J To
permit a party to "repudiate its solemn promise" to adhere to
such a forum selection clause would "reflect a 'parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in
our courts ... .21 Scherk, fairly read, is a harbinger of changing attitudes.
A pair of cases heard during the 1984-85 Term furnished
an occasion for further reflection on the value of arbitration in
the securities context. In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,'
the Supreme Court held that a securities dealer could compel a
customer to submit pendent state law claims (not themselves
subject to a statutory nonwaiver prohibition) to arbitration

' See, e.g., Smoky Greenhaw Cotton Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 720 F.2d 1446, 1448 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 928 (1987);
Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); see also
Jeffirey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of ArbitrationAgreements,
22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259, 286 (1990).
' See, e.g., Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 230 (3d Cir. 1989).
15 See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardener-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44-45 (1974).
' See, e-g., Lewis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 431 F. Supp.

271, 275-78 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
' See, e.g., American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821,
826-28 (2d Cir. 1968).
,' 417 U.S. 506, rehlg denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
Id- at 515-18.
21

Id at 519.

2"

Id. (quoting Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) (emphasis

supplied)).
22 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
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even though the related federal law claims had to proceed to
adjudication. Ironically, the Court premised this ruling on its
conclusion that upholding the arbitration clause in this manner served to advance the FAA's central policy of enforcing
private agreements to arbitrate legal claims, 23 a thought process that blithely overlooked the creation of parallel (and essentially duplicative) litigation in contravention of the very
policies of efficiency and economy that the FAA was designed
to promote. On somewhat similar grounds, the Court in24
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
upheld the validity of an agreement to arbitrate antitrust disputes arising under the Sherman Act, proclaiming that "we are
well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of
arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of
dispute resolution."' These decisions reveal that the Justices
were achieving a greater comfort level with arbitral solutions.
The handwriting was on the wall.
Two years later, the McMahon Court drove a stake
through the heart of Wilko, holding that all claims under the
Exchange Act-the statute under which the bulk of claims
against brokers are brought 2 6-- are subject to mandatory arbitration if customer-dealer agreements so provide. By the time
the decision was tendered, America bore little resemblance to
the nation in which the Wilko Justices lived. Public institutions still reeled from the damage of Vietnam and Watergate,
the President identified government as the principal enemy of
the people, and faith in the unchecked private sector rose in
tandem with stock prices. McMahon symbolized these changing
times and reflected the fact that, by the mid-1980s, the Wilko
Court's distrust of arbitration, if ever justifiable or supportable, had become old hat. Over and beyond that symbolism,
the McMahon Court's reasoning is significant for its evangelical expression of a newfound faith in the techniques of ADR.

2' Id. at 219-20.
24 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
Id. at 626-27.
26 See, e.g., Constantine

N.

BROOK. L. REv. 1113, 1115 (1993).

Katsoris, Should McMahon Be Revisited?, 69
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Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor scrapped the
Wilko Court's approach and began instead from the premise
that the FAA mandated judicial enforcement of all arbitration
agreements on par with other contractual provisions, and this
mandate controlled in the absence of a clearly expressed contrary legislative intent.' The Court then moved to the Exchange Act's nonwaiver provision and determined that it prohibited only waivers of compliance with the Act's substantive
protections, not waivers of jurisdictional provisions. To justify
this departure from precedent, the Court reduced Wilko to the
proposition that predispute arbitration agreements were unenforceable then because "arbitration [in 1953] was judged inadequate to enforce [Securities Act] rights. " '
Now, however, contemporary securities arbitration had
matured, and modern improvements in the arbitration process
made many of Wilko's reservations obsolete. In espousing this
rationale and finding arbitration sufficiently capable of protecting Exchange Act rights, the Court emphasized the emerging
role of the SEC-which appeared as an amicus on behalf of the
securities industry after years of opposing predispute arbitration agreements-in reviewing the arbitration procedures of
the industry's self-regulatory organizations ("SROs"). In the
end, the Court concluded that SRO sponsored arbitration provided investors with adequate protection.2
After McMahon, Wilko lived on only as a ghost of its former self, haunting the securities bar until the Court finally
exorcised it from the body of American jurisprudence in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc." After
that decision, which overruled Wilko and held squarely that
disputes under the Securities Act were arbitrable, securities
dealers were free to enforce predispute arbitration agreements
arising under both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.

Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 229 (1987).
Id at 228-29.
2 Noting that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (VRICO") did not contain a nonwaiver provision, the McMahon Court unanimously held
that RICO claims could be subjected to compulsory arbitration. Id. at 238-42. Congress had the last word: It revised the statute to delete securities fraud from the
list of predicate acts that could animate a RICO claim. See Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (Supp. 1996).
3' 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
2'
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The Rodriguez Court made little effort to defend the Wilko
Court's rationale. Instead, the Court wrote off Wilko as a relic
contaminated by the "old judicial hostility to arbitration."31
Citing McMahon, the Rodriguez Court viewed subsequent improvements to the arbitration process as revealing the inadequacies of Wilko's analysis and statutory interpretation.32
Although the Wilko Court undoubtedly possessed the prejudices that the McMahon Court attributed to it, the argument
that the changed nature of arbitration in itself suffices to carry
the day seems unconvincing. The cornerstone of the McMahon
Court's distinction is that, since Wilko was handed down, Congress granted the SEC explicit statutory authority to oversee
SROs' arbitration procedures. Apparently, the Commission had
only limited authority over SROs' arbitration procedures in the
1950s. This cornerstone is set in sand rather than cement: as
Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent, the Commission's newfound authority extended only to reviewing the procedures
adopted by the SROs and not to reviewing specific arbitration
cases. 3 Indeed, SROs still carry out their activities with a
great deal of independence from Commission oversight.' 4 In
short, the McMahon Court may have overestimated the SEC's
ability to protect the quality of arbitral proceedings.
None of this is to say that the situation remained static
over the more than three decades that separated Wilko and
McMahon; in the interim SROs substantially upgraded their
arbitration procedures, most notably by the promulgation and
adoption of a Uniform Code of Arbitration.35 The Uniform
Code provided much-needed guidance to arbitrators and
brought a far greater degree of predictability to arbitral pro31 Id.
at 480 (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126
F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)).

32 Id. at 483.
3 Shearson/American

Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 265 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
31 Even with the SEC looking on, the NASD has faced in recent years a substantial antitrust investigation by the Department of Justice and a lawsuit by the
SEC itself for alleged industry-wide manipulative pricing practices. See Jeffrey
Taylor & Deborah Lohse, SEC Seeks Settlement with NASD, WALL ST. J., June 18,
1996, at C1.
" See, e.g., Katsoris, supra note 26, at 1117-19 (citing SECURITIES INDUSTRY
CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, SECOND REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: PROPOSAL FOR A UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION (1978)).
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ceedings. Without diminishing the industry's accomplishments,
however, it is fair to say that most of the shortcomings which
concerned the Wilko Court remain unchanged: arbitrators customarily do not generate written opinions; their decisions are
not given precedential weight in subsequent arbitrations; there
is usually no developed record available for review (save, perhaps, for a transcript of the hearing itself); and judicial review
of arbitral awards is so narrowly circumscribed as to be virtually useless.36 Simply put, the explicit grant of powers to the
SEC has not altered the bone structure of arbitration.
Furthermore, nothing in the text of the FAA even empowers a court to review the procedural format of an arbitration
mechanism selected by the parties (beyond what is in essence
review for abuse of process)." The choice of arbitration procedures is left entirely to the agreement of the contracting parties.3" Thus, to the extent that the nonwaiver provisions in
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act prohibit only waivers
of the organic statutes' substantive provisions, the Court's
general analysis of arbitration procedures in McMahon is beside any relevant point.
Once one realizes the doubtful validity of depicting the
evolution of securities arbitration toward a higher form of
existence, it becomes apparent that, whatever the McMahon
Court said, the driving force behind its approach lay in a pragmatic policy choice: a choice to elevate the FAA's goal of promoting the enforcement of arbitration agreements to permit
speedy and inexpensive dispute resolution over the more traditional, but also more cumbersome, mechanism of adjudication.
The relative emphasis on one policy choice over the other is the
essence of the disagreement between the McMahon and Wilko
Courts. A fair reading of McMahon is that the Justices believed securities arbitration always had been up to the task of
resolving disputes between investors and brokerage houses,
and that Wilko was a frolic and an aberration. In McMahon,

See, e.g., Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1990).
See id. at 8-9.
One federal court recently went so far as to say that parties may even alter
the grounds on which an arbitrator's decision may be reviewed. See PaineWebber,

Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589, 599 (1st Cir. 1996).

1442
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the Court belatedly gave effect to Congress' ancient wish to
experiment with the arbitrator's conference room as a viable
alternative to the courthouse.
This brings us full circle: The laissez-faire era of the 1920s
which gave birth to the FAA 9 -and against which the postDepression Wilko Court rebelled-is similar to the virulently
free-market era that produced McMahon. The securities arbitration line of cases depicts, like few others, the Court's ongoing struggle to reconcile the codification of the New Deal's freemarket sobriety with statutory memorials to this country's
abiding faith in Adam Smith's invisible hand.
Since McMahon, the roster of claims that parties may
agree to send to arbitration has lengthened dramatically. The
securities field is emblematic of this expansion. Arbitrators
operating under the SROs' auspices now are resolving employment disputes under Title VII,4" the ADEA,4 and the ERISA
statute4 2-- areas far removed from the heralded competence of
securities arbitrators. Several courts-perhaps recognizing that
the McMahon Court's emphasis on administrative oversight of
" Another interesting parallel is that the FAA was enacted at a time when
observers of the courts believed there was a litigation crisis. See Stempel, supra
note 13, at 277, 355 n.66 (noting that the "proponents of the [FAA], and probably
the Congress that passed it, viewed arbitration as a substantial means of docket
reduction and saw themselves as living in the midst of a litigation explosion").
Similarly, during the 1980s the courts have once again become mired in a confidence crisis. See infra Part II.
" See, e.g., Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 699 (11th Cir.
1992) (upholding agreement to arbitrate employment disputes where plaintiff
raised Title VII and common law claims); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
939 F.2d 229, 229 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding compulsory arbitration of Title VII
claims), dismissed, 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992); see generally Stuart H. Bompey
& Michael P. Pappas, Is There a Better Way? Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims After Gilmer, 19 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 197, 197 (199394) (observing that federal and state courts have upheld predispute arbitration
clauses in the context of civil rights disputes both within and without the securities industry); Megan L. Dunphy, Comment, Mandatory Arbitration: Stripping
Securities Industry Employees of Their Civil Rights, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 1169,
1204 (1995) (mourning the willingness of federal courts to send civil rights claims
to compulsory arbitration).
41 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23, 26 (1991)
(holding that predispute arbitration agreement between registered representative
and stock exchange mandated arbitration of claims arising under the ADEA of
1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-631 (1994)).
42 See, e.g., Bird v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116,
117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1251 (1991) (upholding compulsory arbitration
of ERISA claims against employer).
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arbitration procedures was superfluous-have gone further and
permitted arbitration of statutory civil rights claims outside
the securities context where there is no administrative oversight of arbitration procedures.43 Whether or not intended
that way by the Court, McMahon has been widely perceived as
a Promethean gesture, freeing the private sector from the burdensome chains of a clogged, tired and unresponsive judicial
system."
H. PROMETHEUS BOUND
Looking backward at McMahon, one wonders whether the
Promethean gesture merely exchanged one set of chains for
another. The answer to that question depends in large part
upon the extent to which arbitration has fulfilled its promise.
After all, the debate between proponents and opponents of
securities arbitration has been waged under the assumption
that arbitration brings something special to the table-swifter,
cheaper, more convenient dispute resolution. To the extent
that this assumption is flawed, the arbitration alternative
itself becomes suspect-for even the most partisan adherents
of arbitration must confess that judicial resolution offers advantages that arbitration lacks: e.g., more sophisticated truthseeking devices, a body of precedent and the availability of
meaningful appellate review. Arbitration is arguably a better
choice only if these advantages are counterbalanced by expedition and inexpensiveness. But are they?
An analysis of the current state of securities arbitration
would be incomplete without first considering the conditions
that created the need for securities arbitration. For this, we
must return to the symbolic-and potentially radical-implications of the McMahon decision for judicial dispute
resolution.

' See Bompey & Pappas, supra note 40, at 197 (observing that federal and
state courts are upholding agreements to arbitrate discrimination claims both inside and outside the securities industry).
" See, e.g., Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 243
(1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (lambasting the Court for approving the "abandonment of the judiciary's role in the resolution of claims under the Exchange
Act").

1444
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In the last decade, courts have been under siege. Attacks
have emanated from the left, the right and the center-attacks
that are fueled by what many observers label as a "litigation
crisis."4 5 Some observers have suggested that the courts' adversarial model itself is to blame for exploding caseloads and
burgeoning dockets. In their view, judicial proceedings lead
parties to polarize their legal positions, stifling incentives for
reaching negotiated-and therefore potentially superior-settlements of private conflicts. 46 Critics also claim that litigation places a premium on rule based conflict resolution at the
expense of practical solutions informed by a more flexible set of
(nonlegal) principles, unwritten norms and community values.47 Moreover, detractors muse, the marriage between increasingly intricate processes of adjudication and time based
compensation for practicing lawyers is an open invitation to
prolong cases beyond all reason.4" In fine, there is a widespread perception that the adjudicatory model, like the dance
of the toreadors, emphasizes stylized conflict over common-

' See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 76
(1985) (describing litigation crisis and refuting claims that no such situation exists); Warren G. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 18 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982)
(arguing that courts are in the midst of a litigation crisis); Harry T. Edwards,
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 669
(1986) (discussing potency of the ADR debate at a time in which the "cost of litigation has substantially increased and the number of cases filed in state and
federal courts has mushroomed."); Susan A. Fitzgibbon, The Judicial Itch, 34 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 485, 550 n.1 (1990) (noting that congested court dockets have contributed to the popularity of ADR methods). But see generally Marc S. Galanter,
Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think
We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
REV. (1983) (examining historical data and debunking the supposed litigation crisis).
46 See, e.g., Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Are Courts Obsolete?, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1385, 1396 (1992) (mulling inability of law to give jury freedom to award compromise verdicts).
47 See, e.g., JEROLD AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 138-47 (1983) (heralding
community based dispute resolution informed by local values in place of adjudication); Judith M. Keegan, The Peacemakers: Biblical Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation as a Model Alternative to Litigation, 1987 MO. J. DIsP. RESOL. 11 (arguing for dispute resolution based on community values, built upon biblical paradigm, and noting genesis of mediation and arbitration in biblical times).
"8See, e.g., NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, SECURITIES ARBITRATION REFORM: REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION TASK FORCE 7 (1996) [hereinafter
TASK FORCE REPORT].
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sense cooperation-and, to make matters worse, looks down its
aristocratic nose at more creative solutions to obvious problems.
Capitalizing on (and contributing to) public discontent
with the courts, the ADR movement has made significant inroads in the past decade. Proponents sing a siren's song: as
contrasted to litigation, they croon, arbitration is cheaper,
speedier, more private, and more informal." In addition, arbitrators are said to have greater expertise than judges (most of
whom are avowed generalists, and damn proud of it) and jurors; they are also freer to do justice, this thesis runs, because
they are not swaddled in the straitjacket of stare decisis. In a
nutshell, the ADR industry has prospered based on its widely
credited claim that it is less "legalistic" than the arthritic judicial system. The sales pitch is working because different constituencies, weary of the protracted delays and inordinate
expense that all too often accompany adjudication, are ready
converts.
This, in brief, is the dream of securities arbitration: a less
expensive, less formal, more efficient method for resolving
disputes that would otherwise become bogged down in the
court system. It is one thing, however, to dream the magnificent dream; it is quite another to evaluate the reality of events
in the cold light of day.
A careful examination of the recent experience in securities arbitration yields surprising results. Securities arbitration
appears atavistically to have acquired some of the most frequently calumnized aspects of civil litigation."O Discovery requests are in vogue,5 and prehearing motion practice relating
" See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 11, at 394 ("arbitration is an increasingly
popular alternative"); Dunphy, supra note 40, at 1172-73 nn.16-17.
50 See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 7 (reporting widespread

concern that securities arbitration is "moving away from a model of informal, expeditious, and inexpensive dispute resolution" due to incorporation of 'too many
characteristics of civil litigation"); Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses Litigation:
The Brave New World of Securities Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1095, 1105-06
(1993) (noting that adoption of civil litigation methods is contributing to an
"emerging compromise between [arbitration's advantages of speed, economy, privacy, and finality] and the protections afforded by judicial procedures").
', See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 7 (citing extensive discovery

requests, stonewalling in response, and dilatory tactics as prime examples of a
"lawyering" approach to arbitration); New York Stock Exchange, Ina Symposium on

Arbitration in the Securities Industry, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1499, 1559 (1995)
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to a myriad of subjects, such as the arbitrability of claims, the
availability of discovery, and the applicability of statutes of
limitations, is commonplace. 2 Even the hearings themselves
look more and more like conventional trials; the duration has
increased, as has the average time between the filing of a
claim and the emergence of a dispositive ruling. 3 Increasingly
formalized procedural and evidentiary standards abound. More
and more, investors find that they need to retain paid advocates (either lawyers or professional nonlawyer paladins) to
offset the well funded representation typically furnished to broker-dealers.5 4
And as the arbitration environment becomes increasingly
litigious, the expense of a typical securities arbitration proceeding mounts, threatening to overtake the cost of a comparable
case in litigation. Data collected for 1989-90 from five federal
district courts indicates that, on average, arbitral decisions
based on a paper record took 279 days to resolve; decisions
emanating from live hearings before arbitral panels on average
consumed 449 days.55 By comparison, the overwhelming majority of civil actions between individual investors and brokerdealers filed in these courts settled or were otherwise disposed
of prior to trial on the merits within 510 days, with the median
time to achieve settlement being 365 days.56 Of the litigated
disputes that proceeded to trial (fourteen percent), time to final
judgment ran 744 days, with a median time of 594 days. "7
More recent evidence indicates that the margin between arbitrated cases and litigated cases is shrinking, and there is every
reason to believe that the cost differential is narrowing commensurately." The short of it is that the time-and-money dif[hereinafter NYSE Symposium] (grousing that securities arbitration discovery phase
has the "smell, the touch, [and] the feel of litigation") (remarks of Michael Stone).
62 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 7.
0 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 7.
54 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 48,
at 7.
5 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: How INVESTORS
FARE 45 (GAO/GGD-92-74) (May 1992) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
56 See id. at 49.
52 See id.
58 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 7 (reporting that "SRO arbitra-

tion has incorporated too many characteristics of civil litigation, thereby undermining ...
the essential advantages of arbitration--speed and low cost"); Katsoris,
supra note 26, at 1119 & n.43 (warning that securities arbitrations have generally
increased both in duration and cost since the McMahon decision).
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ferences between arbitration and litigation are not nearly as
great as one might expect. As the gap closes, the widely advertised advantages of arbitration over litigation recede.
The rebirth of the litigation model in the securities arbitration context is a worrisome development. Among other
things, it challenges the bedrock assumption that the private
sector is able to manage conflict better and more cheaply than
the courts. Recognizing that this trend undermines the foundation on which the securities industry built the arbitral alternative,59 the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD") assembled a blue-ribbon task force to look into matters. The Task Force quickly verified the existence of the problem. It determined that the "increasingly litigious nature of
securities arbitration has gradually eroded the advantages of
SRO arbitration!' and that all parties in interest-brokerage
houses and investors alike-perceived securities arbitration to
be "moving away from a model of informal, expeditious, and inexpensive dispute resolution."6
Where does this leave us? Securities arbitration may have
been fraught with difficulties from the start, but the concept
had undeniable advantages. To the extent that the arbitration
model recreates itself in the image of the litigation model,
these advantages erode. This metamorphosis gives rise to a
bizarre paradox: A dispute resolving technique bred as an escape from the excesses of litigation seems bent on transmogrifying itself into that which it despised. Those arbitration advocates who once hurried out of courthouses to seek their own
fortune are now, like so many of today's children, pining for
their old rooms.
It is difficult to isolate a specific explanation for this volte
face. Part of the problem is that it is hard to tell the symptoms
from the causes. Another difficulty is the myriad of possible
explanations, including the growing litigiousness of society, the
essentially standardless nature of arbitration, and the increasing participation of lawyers in the arbitral process. Despite

See Lynn Katzler, Comment, Should Mandatory Written Opinions Be Re.
quired in All Securities Arbitrations?: The Practical and Legal Implications to the

Securities Industry, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 163-64 (1995) (noting the objective of
the Task Force: to discern causes for the increasing ineffectiveness, inefficiency

and cost of securities arbitration).
60 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 7.
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this uncertainty, it seems fairly clear that broader systemic
forces have had a hand in molding the securities arbitration
process. One such force is the longstanding jurisdictional rivalry between the courts and privately sponsored alternatives
(such as securities arbitration) that are designed to oust the
courts' jurisdiction over classes of disputes. Some scholars suggest that competitive interaction between courts and ADR
firms is desirable because it will lead to more efficient dispute
resolution. 61 This chanty has a pleasing melody, but the lyrics
do not fit.
One of the by-products of market competition is a rough
kind of averaging: In striving to maximize market share, competitors tend to imitate each other and, thus, competing products-say, political parties or religions-become less distinct
over time. This middling tendency-known to economists as
the Hotelling Paradox 6 2-- undermines any assurance that
competitors will innovate or make better products. All it ensures is that a competitor which sets out to differentiate its
products probably will produce a good or service that, over
time, becomes more and more similar to the good or service
offered by the market leader. Moreover, because this is a dynamic process, the market leader often will adjust by pirating
some of the product differentiating aspects of the second entrant.
The Hotelling Paradox appears to be at work here. In their
attempt to "compete" for the courts' business, the SROs increasingly have adopted certain features of litigation. Like
some competitors, the courts have responded by offering versions of ADR services (in addition to an increasing emphasis
on their ancient ADR mechanism: settlement). As the two
systems compete, distinctions blur, and we are left with one
dish that, while edible, retains none of the spices which distinguished its two predecessors. The Hotelling Paradox, if allowed
to continue unchecked, risks leaving parties with no option but
the same thin gruel.
61See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1987) (arguing that "elcompetition and the values

underlying competition should play a major role in shaping future dispute resolution mechanisms").
6'2See generally HEINZ KOHLER, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 256-60 (2d ed. 1986).
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III. THE FLICKERING TORCH
The current state of affairs in securities arbitration might
not be as much of a concern were it not for the fact that the
future looks even more problematic. The principal cause for
unease hes in the recommendations assembled by the prestigious NASD Task Force. While accurately noting the emerging
problems, the Task Force has suggested some reforms that run
the risk of making arbitration look even more like civil litigation.
Take, for example, the Task Force's recommendation that
the NASD formalize its discovery procedures. The Task Force
found that the process has been marred by both overreaching
(broadcast discovery requests) and by stonewalling (refusing to
respond fully to discovery demands).' Its solution to this set
of problems consists of a general overhaul of the entire discovery mechanism. This would entail adopting rules requiring the
automatic production of "essential documents" early in an
arbitral proceeding.' While this proposal has some promise,
it is difficult to say how effective it might be. Certainly, the
endless proliferation of elaborate discovery requests has not
been eliminated in civil litigation despite the inauguration of
an automatic production rule.' Perhaps securities cases are
different,'6 but the fear remains that they are not. This fear
seems particularly well founded because, under the Task
Force's proposal, parties would continue to be able to request
other items not listed in the automatic discovery rule upon a
showing that the desired discovery is reasonably likely to be

See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 78-79.
6' See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 82. The prototype for this proposal is the mandatory early disclosure provision familiar to civil litigants, which
provides that a party must "without awaiting a discovery requestV furnish a standardized list of data to his adversary. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a).
See Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in DiscoereY-The Rush to
Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1 (1992).
According to the Task Force, automatic document production is especially
useful in securities arbitration because, "[ulnlike civil litigation generally, securities
arbitration claims routinely present recurring issues that require the same types of
evidence." TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 82.
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relevant and important to a disputed issue.'7 This language is
not much of a deterrent to a securities bar that has prospered
by churning out papers.
Another Task Force suggestion that may have unfortunate
consequences is the recommendation that arbitrators be appointed much earlier in the process so that, among other functions, they can play a greater role in the discovery phase.
Along with providing for earlier appointment, the Task Force
also recommends enhancing the role of arbitrators, tutoring
them in how to perform that role, and hiking their compensation.6" These are profound changes and, while they sound
pleasing, if adopted they will almost certainly lead to a
professionalization of the arbitral pool (and, concomitantly, a
formalization of the arbitration process). Indeed, the Task
Force frankly acknowledges that
[w]ith the changes in securities arbitration... the traditional model
of arbitration has become difficult to sustain. The demands upon
securities arbitrators in terms of training, expertise, responsibilities,
and time commitment have grown dramatically. Many believe that
the inevitable result will be a cadre of professional, full time arbitrators, not unlike the judiciary.6"

This fits hand-in-glove with the jurisdictional sprawl that
has trailed in McMahon's wake. Because arbitrators must now
decide a much more diversified array of cases-ranging from
Title VII to ERISA-they will have to become jacks-of-alltrades, or, in other words, generalists (much like judges). Just
as formalization of the process undercuts one principal advantage of arbitration-flexibility-so, too, professionalization of
the decisionmaking function undercuts another principal advantage of arbitration-decisionmaking by persons who have
expertise in a technical field. In the bargain, increased
professionalization also threatens to shrink the pool of qualified individuals who are willing to serve as arbitrators."0
These dangers are all the more ominous because some observers have already voiced qualms that arbitrators are ill-

67

See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 84.

See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 86-88.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 88-89 (emphasis supplied).
The Task Force Report notes that increasing the role of arbitrators is also
likely to dissuade qualified individuals-who usually lead busy "outside"
lives-from service. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 89.
68
69
70
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equipped to handle the large and complex securities disputes
that formerly fell within the province of judges and the
courts."'
Other Task Force recommendations, if implemented, would
move securities arbitration even closer to the litigation model.
For instance, the Task Force suggests that arbitrators provide
written explanations of any decision to grant or reject a motion
to dismiss on the basis of a statute of limitations.' This proposal brings to the table a feature that has slowed the progress
of cases through the courts, but since the arbitrators' written
explanations presumably would not have precedential value,'
the proposal denies the benefit that ordinarily would accrue.
Finally, in what is perhaps the most revealing window on
the state of securities arbitration, the Task Force recommends
that the NASD initiate and expand voluntary mediation and
Early Neutral Evaluation ("ENE") programs as an alternative
to an arbitration process that has become "too adversarial, too
costly, and too time[-]consuming."' Whether intended or not,
the irony in this comment is palpable, and the statement
shows just how far contemporary securities arbitration has
strayed from its historic homeland.

IV. THE CiRcLiNG VULTURES
As our parents and teachers always have been fond of
reminding us, actions have consequences. If the concept of
arbitrating customer-broker disputes in the securities field is a
sound one-and most observers, aware that the judicial system
is poorly equipped to deal expeditiously with the small-dollar
disputes that typify the genre, think that it is -- then the
current trend in securities arbitration seems to invite unfortunate results. The principal threat to the continued sustain7

See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 11.
See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 30. Others have gone further

and argued that arbitrators should hand down written opinions in all cases. See
WRITTEN OPINIONS, supra note 59, at 157 (opining that arbitral rules should be
amended 'to require a statement of the underlying reasons for the award because,
as currently written, the rule fails to protect investors as intended by Congress').
' See Katsoris, supra note 26, at 1133; Katzler, supra note 59, at 151, 175,
196.
74 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 47.
71 See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 11, at 458.
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ability of securities arbitration is that it may come to resemble
litigation so closely that it, too, will become muscle-bound and
thus unable to deal expeditiously with the mine-run of customer-broker controversies. Put bluntly, a private dispute resolving system that models itself on the courts will have less and
less legitimacy as an alternative to litigation. If it walks like a
duck and squawks like a duck, many people will think either
that it is a duck or that it is so similar a creature as to make
any difference inconsequential.
This thought is hardly new or original. Commentators
have foreseen since the time of the McMahon decision that
such a scenario would not bode well for the continued relevance of securities arbitration." Of course, securities arbitration, even under a litigation model, would continue to lighten
the courts' caseloads. This is a current priority of
policymakers,77 but it strains credulity that this benefit,
standing alone, will prove to be enough to ensure the viability
of the arbitration alternative. The courts are far from perfect,
but the hard truth is that neither securities arbitration nor
any other private dispute resolution mechanism has ever been
properly equipped to beat the courts at their own game. Insofar as securities arbitration is concerned, the lack of an organic
body of precedent and the narrow scope permitted for judicial
review bear witness to this verity. They are only two of several
shortcomings that typically burden alternatives to conventional
adjudication. The mills of the courts grind slowly, and the cost
of the grinding is steep-but courts possess all the trappings of
fairness (e.g., openness to public scrutiny, impartial
decisionmakers, reasoned decisionmaking, meaningful appellate review) that private alternatives cannot readily offer.
It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that if parties begin
to feel that arbitration is merely a marginally more efficient
method of dispute resolution, saddled with an increasing num-

76 See C. Edward Fletcher III, Learning to Live with the Federal Arbitration
Act-Securities Arbitration in a Post-McMahon World, 37 EMORY L.J. 99, 133-37
(1988) (warning that law's acceptance of securities arbitration as an alternative to
the courts poses the risk that it may "become co-opted by the law and eventually
become so formalized that it takes on the characteristics of other legal institutions").
77 See, e.g., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, STALKING THE INCREASE IN THE RATE
OF FEDERAL CIVL APPEALS 1 (1995).
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ber of the procedural accoutrements that bog down conventional litigation while driving up its cost, then there will be mounting pressure to stay with the real McCoy and keep disputes
within the judicial system. If a litigation model will prevail in
all available fora, then there is a huge incentive for parties to
choose the forum that has the most stability and the greatest
experience in adjudicating disputes.
Some might demur on the ground that the labor arbitration experience indicates otherwise. Private labor arbitration
grew out of the need to provide alternatives to the dislocations
caused by strikes and lockouts.78 Thanks largely to Congress,
various administrative agencies, and the courts, the relative
freewheeling of labor arbitration has given way to a litigation
model complete with a home grown concept of stare decisis, a
corpus of written opinions, and a widening scope of judicial
review. 9 Yet, despite these embellishments labor arbitration
has flourished. Though this might suggest at first blush that
an increasingly judicialized arbitral forum can remain viable
even in the absence of demonstrable efficiency gains, the suggestion will not wash. Labor arbitration is waged between relative equals and offers unions and management a singular benefit not present in the securities context: It replaces the general strike and the lockout as the principal means for resolving
industrial disputes. In contrast, securities arbitration accomplishes no such overriding objective; it is supposed to be a
cheaper, quicker, more private and more efficacious alternative
to the courts-nothing more. If the arbitration model
squanders these advantages, there is little to suggest that
people will choose it as an alternative to litigation.
Another, closely related danger exists. If arbitration continues to abandon those features of dispute resolution that
make it attractive, then the courts can be expected to move
into the resultant vacuum. Courts already face legislative pressure to create their own ADR systems.' Such pressure reflects the fear that the litigation model has become so rule
bound that it cannot, without external prodding, adapt to the
flexible, practical methods of dispute resolution that contempo-

'

See Fitzgibbon, supra note 45, at 488.
Edwards, supra note 45, at 680.
See, e.g., Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994).
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rary society demands."' If securities arbitration remains so
intent on judicialization that it neglects the brave new world of
ADR, then one suspects that legislative initiative and an innate sense of self-preservation will combine to push the courts
in that direction.
V. PROMETHEUS UNBOUND

This, then, is the challenge faced by contemporary securities arbitration: that, in its struggle for respectability, it will
become an increasingly irrelevant, warmed-over variant of
conventional adjudication. Such a development would be a step
backward. In an ever more complex civilization, it is socially
useful-and wise-to have separate kinds of dispute resolution
mechanisms. The courts are in a fair amount of trouble, 2 but
they are not candidates for the endangered species list. And
they are for the foreseeable future likely to remain rule bound,
procedure oriented institutions. This is neither a grave disappointment nor, in itself, a bad thing; a certain procedural emphasis is necessary if the judiciary is to perform its essential
function. But there is clearly room and reason for other options. The existence of a specialized, privately operated forum,
tailored to handle problems that arise repetitively within a
delineated industry and in which procedural safeguards are
relaxed in the service of speedier, more private, less expensive
dispute resolution, seems highly desirable. These options, operating in parallel, give disputants the luxury of choice-and the
very fact that two systems exist will exacuate both of them.
To achieve this objective, however, securities arbitration
must return to its first principles. That means, of course, that
securities arbitration must jettison some of the flotsam of litigation that it has accumulated and avoid the further clutter
that it has been eyeing. Securities arbitration is a desirable
alternative to the courts only if it provides tangible benefits
that adjudication cannot easily replicate. Thus, to prosper in
the future, arbitration must relearn the lessons of the past.

'l

Chronicled supra Part II.

The courts' difficulties have been more fully chronicled elsewhere. See, e.g.,
Bruce M. Selya, The Confidence Game, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 909 (1996).
82
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Along the way, the securities industry must break out of
the mold of the Hotelling Paradox. While the industry must
strive to make securities arbitration fair and efficient, it must
not dissipate the advantages inherent in the arbitral forum. In
this market, product differentiation is critical: the purpose of
securities arbitration is not to provide a cheaper imitation of
adjudication but, rather, to permit investors and brokerage
houses to resolve their disputes swiftly and inexpensively. This
is precisely why Congress and the courts sanctioned securities
arbitration in the first place.
An automobile analogy may help illustrate the point. The
majordomos of securities arbitration have begun to act like a
Ford dealer who bedecks a base model with fancy gewgaws
and then attempts to compete with a nearby Mercedes dealer.
That strategy is doomed to failure; longtime Ford owners will
probably think that the unnecessary accoutrements are not
worth the added cost, while longtime Mercedes owners will almost certainly prefer the genuine article. The way to sell a
Ford is as an alternative means of transportation-a vehicle
which is serviceable, less conspicuous, and far less pricey.
A decision to return securities arbitration to its home soil
requires a certain boldness. The industry has a stake in the
Task Force-a group composed of distinguished persons knowledgeable in the field-and a change in direction would entail
rejecting many of the Task Force recommendations chronicled
in Part III of this Article. But taking this route will permit us
to retain the baby while draining the bath water. To cite one
example, the Task Force correctly notes the problems that attend the current discovery process in securities arbitration, but
formalizing the procedure, as the Task Force proposes, will
simply accelerate the movement toward the contemporary
litigation model. Allowing the arbitrator more flexibility to
shape discovery according to-the needs of the specific situation
would seem to hold more promise than making arbitral discovery increasingly rule based.
At the same time, we must not unduly burden arbitrators.
They must remain free to decide their cases in an informal,
efficient, and flexible manner. Any effort to force exegetic written opinions or mandatory statements of the rationales underlying decisions should be strongly resisted.
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Proponents claim that these recommended innovations,
while cumbersome, will make securities arbitration fairer. At
the risk of sounding heretical, I assert that improved fairness
should not be the main objective. In striving to keep securities
arbitration as close to the Ford "base model" as possible, we
must recognize that arbitration will not always yield the same
outcomes as would occur in adjudication. Streamlined arbitration procedures risk producing somewhat less accurate results
than full-fledged trials, but the savings in time and money that
arbitration affords can compensate for some lessened degree of
accuracy. As with the test limned by the Supreme Court for detecting violations of procedural due process," we must balance the risk of an incorrect result in an arbitral proceeding
against the public interest in having a more efficient, less
formal alternative to conventional adjudication. Just as the
Mathews Court found that the strictest procedural safeguards
were not required in less formal administrative contexts," we
should permit the relaxation of litigation based standards in
securities arbitration.
This state of affairs is all the more tolerable because little
probative evidence exists to support a conclusion that the relative informality of securities arbitration is systematically unfair
in any way. Although some commentators decry the dangers of
industry control over the rites of securities arbitration,8 5 the
General Accounting Office has found that investors win sixty
percent of the cases brought in securities arbitration and that
arbitrators typically award sixty percent of the amount investors claim as losses in their complaints. This compares favorably with conventional adjudication, in which investors prevail
roughly forty percent of the time.8"
In the end, the best alternative is to have alternatives. A
healthy judicial system and a vibrant private arbitration mechanism, coexisting in parallel, constitute an effective guarantee
that parties will be able to take their disputes to that forum
which can best resolve them.8 7 We must remember ShakeSee Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
See id. at 348-49.
'5 See, e.g., Lydia A. Hervatin, Note, Predispute Arbitration Agreements in Secu.
rities Disputes: Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.--Speedy
Justice or Just Speed?, 24 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 757 (1991).
86 See GAO REPORT, supra note 55, at 31.
' In this regard, securities arbitration should also recognize its own limitations
"
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speare's admonition that "the world is broad and wide,"' and
our society has both the space and the need for distinctive
methods of dispute resolution, not merely a forthright method

of court run adjudication and a pale pastiche of it. Preserving
healthy adjudicatory and arbitral options is the objective toward which we, as judges, academics, industry leaders and
lawyers, should strive.

and confine its scope to those areas in which it can operate most efficiently and
do the greatest good. Voluntary agreements to arbitrate have a place in the securities context where the outcome of a typical dispute often depends on documentation. The use of mandatory arbitration to resolve ERISA and Title VII claims is
much harder to justify as such claims typically depend more upon the credibility
of witnesses and other elements better suited to the truth seeking devices of traditional adjudication. In addition, forcing arbitrators to handle cases outside their
specific area of expertise will have the unfortunate effect, chronicled supra Part
III, of requiring them to become generalists (i.e., more like public-sector judges)
and thereby destroying the current advantage that attends decisionmaking by
individuals with technical proficiency in the securities field.
WILLI SHAKESPEARE, ROmEO AND JULIET act 3, sc 3, L 56 (1595).

